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FOREWORD
Dr. Jeffrey Record, a professor emeritus of strategy at the Air War College in Montgomery, Alabama,
examines the causes of the Axis defeat in World War II
and postulates still relevant lessons that we can learn
from that defeat. Record contends that the Axis was
beaten by a combination of resource inferiority (after
1941) and strategic incompetence—for example, the
pursuit of territorial ambitions far beyond the limits
of Axis strength. World War II’s lessons for the future
include the enduring importance of material strength
even in an age of irregular warfare; the pernicious
effects of extreme ideology on sound strategic judgment; and the limits of operational and tactical superiority in delivering strategic success.
Dr. Record completely dispels the notion that the
Second World War has no pertinence to navigating
through the strategic challenges of the present era.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute and
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
Why did the Axis Powers lose World War II, and
what can we learn from its defeat? The Axis seemed on
top of the world until 1941, when it added to its list of
enemies the United States and the Soviet Union. The
entry of Russia and America into the war decisively
tipped the balance against Germany, Italy, and Japan.
Resource-rich Russia and the United States were prepared for protracted conflict, whereas the Axis was not.
From Pearl Harbor onward, it is difficult to imagine
how the Axis could have avoided the fate that befell it,
short of Stalin’s defection from the Allied side.
Material weakness should have imposed strategic
discipline on Axis territorial ambitions, but none of the
three major Axis states seemed to recognize the limits
of their power. Imperial ambitions, fueled by extreme
ideologies, held sway over a realistic grasp of what
was possible and what was not.
An examination of World War II’s outcome reveals
three lessons. First, numbers still matter. The best
strategy is to be strong. The strong sometimes lose,
but the weak lose more often. Second, ideology can
distort sound strategic thinking. Both Germany and
Japan were victimized by extreme racial ideologies
that prompted them to overestimate their own fighting
power and underestimate that of their enemies. Third,
operational and tactical superiority cannot redeem a
faulty strategy. Throughout the war, Germany outperformed its enemies on the battlefield; however, it was
still crushed strategically.
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ENDS, MEANS, IDEOLOGY, AND PRIDE:
WHY THE AXIS LOST AND WHAT WE CAN
LEARN FROM ITS DEFEAT
INTRODUCTION
Carl von Clausewitz believed that “superiority of
numbers is the most common element of victory,” and
that the “best strategy is to be strong.” However, the
great Prussian philosopher of war also recognized that:
superiority of numbers in a given engagement is only one
of the factors that determines victory. Superior numbers,
far from contributing everything, or even a substantial
part, to victory, may actually be contributing very little,
depending on the circumstances.1

Those circumstances might include a weaker
enemy with a stronger willingness to fight and die, or
with a superior strategy, such as irregular warfare of
the kind that sapped the French and American will to
win in Indochina. Nevertheless, it is always better to be
stronger than weaker, especially when both sides are
waging a regular war. All armed combatants, be they
states, insurgencies, or gangs, seek strength because
strength protects, confers security choices, and usually—though not always—prevails. Guerrilla warfare,
terrorism, and other forms of irregular warfare are
hardly the preferred choices of the weaker side. On
the contrary, they are dictated by weakness. Irregular
warfare is a matter of necessity, not choice. Colin Gray
observed:
In irregular warfare a relatively resource-rich regular side
is pitted against a resource-challenged foe. Of necessity,
the latter must operate by stealth, and has to avoid open
combat except under conditions of its own choice.2
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Mao Zedong himself rejected guerrilla warfare as a
means to decisive victory; it was but a preparatory
stage to gaining the ability to conduct operations
from superior strength—i.e., final-phase conventional
warfare.
Almost a decade ago, the study Beating Goliath:
Why Insurgencies Win was published, which examined
weaker-side victories over powerful states and the reasons for their success.3 According to extant theory, as
well as my own thinking, the weaker-side wins rested
on some combination of a stronger will to win,4 a more
effective strategy,5 the political composition of the
stronger side (democracy versus dictatorship), and
access to external assistance.6 My research revealed
that foreign help was a common enabler of victorious
insurgent wars, and that such help, while certainly no
guarantee of insurgent success, can even transform
the weaker side into the stronger one.7 For example,
the available evidence suggests that by the time of the
Battle of Yorktown in October 1781, the American side,
which included the Continental Army, local militias,
and French naval and ground forces (to say nothing of
massive French financial credits and gunpowder shipments), was the materially preponderant side.8
Here, this monograph wishes to explore the causes
of conflict outcomes not between strong states and
weak nonstate challengers, but rather between strong
states themselves, using World War II as an illustrative vehicle and focusing on the relative role that the
war’s tangibles and intangibles played in that conflict’s outcome. On its face, World War II would seem
to offer little insight into the kinds of war that have
dominated the post-1945 era, especially the post-Cold
War period. However, the relative influence of material versus nonmaterial factors, especially the degree to
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which they can be substituted for each other, remains
an enduring issue in the study of war. World War II
was the last and most stupendous great power war,
and although predominantly a regular war, it contains
instruction relevant to other forms of armed conflict.
Great powers are by definition the strongest of
states in terms of territory, population, industrial
power, financial resources, technological prowess,
and military forces. Of course, there are considerable
disparities in strength among great powers. In terms
of raw physical strength, for example, the main Axis
Powers (Germany, Japan, and Italy) were severely disadvantaged by the major Allied Powers (Great Britain and its empire, the Soviet Union, and the United
States). In the case of Italy, pretensions of great power
status were delusional, and Japan’s fighting power,
though impressive, could not overcome the American homeland’s geographic advantage (being beyond
Tokyo’s military reach) and overwhelming war production superiority. Indeed, the degree of Allied superiority over the Axis, including a near monopoly of
access to the world’s petroleum deposits, points to the
conclusion that World War II’s outcome was predetermined. The resource disparity between Japan and
the United States was especially severe, leading Colin
Gray to judge that the Pacific War “was a conflict that
Imperial Japan was always going to lose [emphasis in
original].”9
“For all of its operational-tactical brilliance, stunning initial victories and plunder, the Axis . . . possessed
less than half the economic power of its enemies,”
observed MacGregor Knox, and:
Barring improbable levels of incompetence or irresolution
in Britain or the United States, that crushing imbalance
doomed the Axis in the intercontinental war of attrition

3

that emerged from Hitler’s failure to destroy Soviet
Russia, Imperial Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor, and the
Fuhrer’s immediately following and wholly eccentric
declaration of war on the United States.10

The numbers are stark. The Allies (excluding China)
enjoyed a 2.7:1 advantage in population and a 7.5:1
advantage in territory, in addition to controlling access
to almost the entire world’s known oil reserves.11 In
addition, in each of the wartime years (1939-1945), the
Allies’ collective gross domestic product (GDP) never
fell below twice that of the Axis.12
I resist being a determinist when it comes to war
outcomes. Resource superiority is always nice to have,
but the trick is to translate that raw superiority into
capable fighting power and then to employ that power
effectively at the tactical and operational levels on
behalf of a competent strategy. This is what the Axis
failed to do.
Germany, Japan, and Italy were strategically
incompetent—i.e., they failed to discipline the relationship between their imperial ambitions and their
military means. Simply put, they bit off more—far
more—than they could chew. They allowed hope to
subvert reality and illusions to subdue sound strategy.
Sir Basil Liddell Hart defined strategy as “the art of
distributing and applying military means to fulfill the
ends of policy.” It depends for success:
first and foremost, on a sound calculation and coordination
of the ends and means. The end must be proportional to
the total means, and the means must be used in gaining
each intermediate end which contributes to the ultimate
end.13

I believe that the combination of resource inferiority
and strategic incompetence doomed the Axis to defeat.
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This is not to denigrate the record of the Allies. Despite
a very mixed tactical and operational performance in
the early years of the war, the Allies orchestrated a war
effort that hitched their material advantage to an effective war-winning strategy. I take no issue with Richard Overy’s Why the Allies Won. The key to victory was
material superiority plus “a very great improvement in
the military effectiveness of Allied forces.”14 It was not
just a question of brawn but also of brains. The Allies
painstakingly learned how to deal with Axis superiority at the sub-strategic levels of war, sometimes overcoming it with sheer brute force, unpleasantly defined
by John Ellis as “two things: an overwhelming physical . . . superiority . . . and a marked lack of finesse
in applying that superiority.”15 Raw power alone does
not confer strategic success. That power has to be transformed into effective war-winning outcomes.
Much has been written about why the Allies won.
However, it is equally important to address the question of why the Axis lost. Germany almost certainly
could have prevailed had Hitler recognized the limits
of German power—the first obligation of a sound strategy. He could have refrained from attacking the Soviet
Union and declaring war on the United States, and
simply stood pat on his European territorial gains as
of May 1941. Absent war with the Russians and Americans, Hitler would have remained dominant on the
European continent with the Soviet Union, still Hitler’s ally by virtue of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Non-Aggression Pact of 1939, continuing to supply Germany
with vital quantities of oil, foodstuffs, and other raw
materials. (Ironically, Nazi-occupied western Russia
supplied Germany but a fraction of what Germany
obtained from a friendly Stalin.) Great Britain would
have remained strategically isolated, with little chance
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of overthrowing German power on the continent and
little chance of inducing an isolationist United States
to enter the war. Barring war with Russia, Hitler might
have had more than sufficient force to sweep British
power and influence out of the Mediterranean and
North Africa, including Gibraltar, Malta, Cyprus, and
Suez. Under such circumstances, even Winston Churchill likely would have been compelled to stop fighting
Germany and come to some kind of terms with Hitler—e.g., Britain’s acceptance of German rule on the
continent in exchange for Hitler’s agreement to leave
the remaining British Empire alone.
Hitler seemingly had it made in May 1941. His
forces occupied France, the Low Countries, Denmark,
Norway, most of Eastern Europe, and the Balkans,
including Greece. He enjoyed friendly fellow fascist
regimes in Spain, Italy, and Romania, as well as a very
beneficial alliance with Stalin. Adam Tooze has concluded that with:
hindsight it is hard to avoid the conclusion that after
the defeat of France Germany would have done better
to adopt a defensive posture, consolidating its position
in Western Europe, attacking British positions in the
Mediterranean and forcing the British and the Americans
to bomb their way onto the Continent.16

Douglas Peifer contends, however, “an Axis victory over the Anglo-Americans in 1941-42 was not as
self-evident as one might think.” He points out that
by mid-1941, Franklin Roosevelt was firmly determined to enter the war of Britain’s side and was
already supplying Churchill with massive quantities
of Lend-Lease assistance. Moreover, Hitler was in less
a position to invade the British Isles than he was in
1940. He had no means of coercing Churchill into some
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kind of settlement, especially given what was already
a de facto Anglo-American alliance, and Germany’s
growing war production disadvantage vis-à-vis Britain alone, to say nothing of the United States. Peifer
also questions whether the Germans had “a viable
strategy for winning the war in the Mediterranean . . .
absent Spanish assent to [a German] attack on Gibraltar,” which was not forthcoming. Also lurking in the
background, although unbeknownst to Hitler, was the
likelihood of an American atomic bomb, which assuredly would have been dropped on German targets had
Germany not surrendered before the summer of 1945.17
Foreswearing conquest of Russia would of course
have forced Hitler to do something that he could never
bring himself to do: renounce a central tenet of his core
ideological convictions. Hitler believed it was his historical destiny to rid Europe of Jews and communism
and to establish a race-based empire in Slavic Europe
stretching from Poland to the Ural Mountains, with surviving Russians reduced to hungry serfs to be worked
to death by their German masters. Hitler also believed
that only the creation of a German empire from the
Atlantic to the Urals would enable him to defeat the
United States, which he regarded as an inevitable
enemy that stood in the way of German world domination. Thus, Hitler’s decision to invade the Soviet
Union was the most consequential strategic decision
of the Second World War. Without it, it is difficult to
imagine how Hitler could have been defeated.
IMPERIAL JAPAN
As for the Japanese, who were never as powerful as
the Germans (at least on land), they could have avoided
war with America had they not been victimized by
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their own racial ideology, which told them they were
destined to rule the Chinese and other “lesser” peoples of Asia, and had they not been persuaded, as was
Hitler, that war with the United States was inevitable.
They could have invaded Southeast Asia, as they did in
1941-42, without attacking American territory. Former
U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt is known to have
worried that a Japanese invasion of only the European-controlled portions of Southeast Asia (e.g., Malaya,
the Dutch East Indies, Singapore, French Indochina)
would make it impossible for him to unite the country
behind a declaration of war against Japan.18 How could
Roosevelt, who in 1941 was straining to join the war in
Europe against Nazi Germany, which was a far more
urgent threat to first-order U.S. security interests than
Japan, make the case for spilling American blood over
a bunch of European colonies in the Far East? “Perhaps
the major error of the Japanese was their decision to
attack the United States when the main objective was
to gain the strategic resources of Southeast Asia,” contends Louis Morton.
Had they bypassed the Philippines and rejected
Yamamoto’s plan for a strike against Pearl Harbor, it is
possible that the United States might not have gone to
war or, if it had that the American people would have
been more favorably disposed to a negotiated peace.19

Belief in the inevitability of war often becomes a
self-fulfilling prophecy because it encourages believers to strike the first blow—to start wars at times and
places of their own choosing. Had the Japanese been
attuned to Roosevelt’s political dilemma—his inability
to take a united America into war absent a direct attack
by Germany or Japan—they might have avoided the
strategic disaster that befell them. The irony, at least
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for the Japanese, was that their attack on Pearl Harbor
inflicted only modest damage on the U.S. Pacific Fleet.
The fleet’s three invaluable aircraft carriers were elsewhere on December 7, 1941, and most of the battleships that were sunk were later refloated and returned
to service. If the attack was but a “military inconvenience” for the United States, it was a “political disaster” for Japan because it implanted in the American
electorate a burning desire for revenge that culminated
in the mass destruction of Japanese cities in 1945.20
The magnitude of Japan’s strategic incompetence is
jaw dropping. Consider the following facts of 1941.
First, Japan’s economy, though fully mobilized
for war, was one-tenth the size of the American economy, a disparity certain to widen as the United States
moved toward complete mobilization.21 (The power of
the United States turned out to be such that Japan’s
defeat consumed only about 15 percent of America’s
total war effort.)22
Second, Japan was vitally dependent on the United
States for key raw materials, including oil, of which
the United States supplied 90 percent of Japan’s
requirements.
Third, Japan was a resource-poor state, completely
dependent on seaborne commerce that it was poorly
prepared to protect in war. For Japan’s Mahan-worshipping Imperial Navy, defending the country’s merchant marine was an afterthought.
Fourth, Japan’s Army ground and air forces were
already tied down in Manchuria (deterring a Soviet
invasion) and in China, where they were stuck in a
4-year unwinnable war. For Japan, the “China Incident” was a Vietnam War writ large.
Fifth, Japan lacked the military wherewithal to
threaten the continental United States, whereas the
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United States could—and eventually did—obliterate the Japanese home islands. Japan was a regional
power, whereas the United States would soon become
a global power.
Given these facts, a prolonged war with an enraged
United States, in which American war production
would prove decisive, was to be avoided at all costs.
However, how could Japan prevent the United States
from taking its time, years if necessary, to amass overwhelming force and project it across the Pacific? It
could not, and some Japanese understood this. Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, for one, who knew America
well, declared in October 1940 that a war with the
United States would be a protracted one, during which
Japan’s resources would be slowly exhausted to the
point of having to quit. “We must not start a war with
so little chance of success,” he warned.23
Certainly, in retrospect, Japan’s decision to attack
the United States seems self-evidently suicidal. “The
Japanese bet in 1941,” wrote Raymond Aron in 1966,
“was senseless since [Japan] . . . had no chance of winning and could avoid losing only if the Americans were
too lazy or cowardly to conquer.”24 Gordon Prange,
the great historian of the Pearl Harbor attack, called
it “a reckless war. [Japan] could not possibly win.”25
Roberta Wohlstetter, in her groundbreaking work,
Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision, condemned the fanciful Japanese assumption that the United States:
with ten times the military potential and a reputation for
waging war until unconditional surrender, would after
a short struggle accept the annihilation of a considerable
part of its naval and air forces and the whole of its power
in the Far East.26
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Toshikazu Kase, a Japanese foreign policy official who
was present on the USS Missouri when Japan surrendered, concluded that the Pacific War “was unequal
from the start. [It] was the product of brains fired
by sheer madness.”27 Looking back on Pearl Harbor,
Haruo Tohmatsu and H. P. Willmott observed simply
“no state or nation has ever been immune from its own
stupidity.”28
How, then, to explain Japan’s decision? Was it
madness? Or simply inexplicable? Here we enter an all
too familiar world—actually the real world—in which
rational calculation of ends and means is constantly
threatened by arrogance, ideology, prejudice, wishful
thinking, and pride.
In the summer of 1941, the Japanese were confronted by what they viewed—with considerable justification—as a stark choice between war with America
and a humiliating political submission to the United
States involving Japan’s ruin as an aspiring great power
via severe U.S. economic sanctions and insistence that
Tokyo abandon its empire in China. For Japan, pride
or “face” dictated a decision to fight regardless of the
consequences. Acceptance of the Roosevelt administration’s suspension of oil deliveries to Japan and
diplomatic insistence that it evacuate China and Indochina in exchange for a resumption of trade with the
United States would have reduced Japan to an American vassal state. Ian Kershaw argued:
For no faction of the Japanese elites could there be a
retreat from the goals of a victorious settlement in China
and a successful expansion to establish . . . Japanese
domination of the Far East. . . .[These objectives] had not
just become an economic imperative. They reflected honor
and national pride, the prestige and standing of a great
power. The alternatives were seen as not just poverty, but
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defeat, humiliation, ignominy, and an end to great power
status in permanent subordination to the United States.29

Japanese reasoning was summed up by Admiral Osami Nagano, Chief of Staff of the Imperial Japanese Navy in September 1941: “Japan would rather
go down fighting than ignobly surrender without a
struggle because surrender would spell spiritual as
well as physical ruin for the nation and its destiny.”30
No wonder the Japanese fought so long and fanatically
to stave off defeat! The employment of suicide aircraft
in 1944-45, like today’s Islamic suicide bombers, testifies to a remarkable combination of determination and
tactical military effectiveness. Indeed, Tokyo’s attitude
in late 1941 was not dissimilar from Churchill’s in the
summer of 1940 when he publicly asserted that he
would prefer that Britain go down fighting rather than
submit to Hitler.
Clearly, the Japanese understood they could not
defeat the United States outright, as had Nazi Germany
vanquished France in 1940, and that Japan’s prospects
in a long war with the United States were poor, even
non-existent. They also assumed, however, that war
with the United States was inevitable, in part because
they regarded the United States and Great Britain as
strategically inseparable. This meant that a Japanese
invasion of Southeast Asia would automatically trigger war with the United States. This was not in fact the
case. War with America was certain only if American
territory was attacked.31
A second—and self-evident—assumption was that
time was working against Japan. The longer Japan
waited to strike the United States, the dimmer its prospects for avoiding defeat. As the trade embargo took
hold and the United States accelerated its rearmament,
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Japanese economic and military power relative to that
of the United States began to decline rapidly. In the
critical category of naval tonnage for example, Japan
in late 1941 possessed a competitive 70 percent of U.S.
tonnage (including tonnage deployed in the Atlantic),
but the Japanese correctly projected, based on published sources (and excluding estimated war loses),
that that ratio would drop to 65 percent in 1942, 50 percent in 1943, and 30 percent in 1944.32 The Two-Ocean
Navy Act passed by the U.S. Congress in July 1940
called for construction of 6 battleships, 18 aircraft carriers, 33 cruisers, 115 destroyers, and 43 submarines.33
H.P. Willmott has observed that the act “doomed the
Imperial Navy to second-class status, since the activities of American shipyards would be as catastrophic
for Japanese aspirations as a disastrous naval battle
would be.”34
Yamamoto had warned Japanese leaders that,
“Anyone who has seen the auto factories of Detroit
and the oil fields in Texas knows that Japan lacks
the national power for a naval race with America.”35
Japan’s relative power would never be better than in
1941. Indeed, during the war years the United States
built 8,812 naval vessels to Japan’s 589.36 Japan’s productive disadvantage in combat aircraft was almost as
grim. In 1941, the United States produced 1,400 combat
aircraft to Japan’s 3,200. Three years later the ratio was
37,500 to 8,300.37
A third assumption, which reflected the near certainty of a long war, was that Japan could force the
United States into a murderous, island-by-island slog
across the Pacific which, it was hoped, would eventually exhaust the Americans’ political will to fight on
to total victory. To bring their power directly to bear
against the Japanese home islands, the Americans
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would have to drive thousands of miles westward
from Hawaii and northward from Australia, plowing through New Guinea and the Philippines, and the
Central Pacific island chains of the Carolines, Gilberts,
and Marianas. By heavily fortifying these territories
and defending them to the death, the Japanese could
raise the blood price to the point where the Americans might settle for terms that would permit Japan to
retain its mainland, if not insular Asian empire. After
all, the strength of U.S. security interests in East Asia
could never equal that of Japan’s.
“The Japanese theory of victory,” contends Colin
Gray:
amounted to the hope—one hesitates to say calculation—
that the United States would judge the cost of defeating
Japan to be too heavy, too disproportionate to the worth
of the interests at stake.38

Referring to the tenacity of Japan’s hopeless defense of
its Central Pacific bastions, Adrian Lewis argues that
the Japanese understood the “futility of their situation,” but that their objective was not victory. Rather,
“it was to inflict as many casualties as possible on
American forces, to hold out as long as possible, and to
prolong the war [and] destroy the will of the American
people.”39 This strategy persisted even into 1945, with
Japanese hardliners in Tokyo insisting that they could
achieve a conditional surrender to the Americans by
turning, or threatening to turn, the defense of the home
islands into an American bloodbath.
The Japanese were correct in assuming they could
impose a protracted war of attrition on the Americans.
They employed a combination of distance and ferocity to force the Americans to grind their way, bloody
assault after bloody assault, across the vast expanses
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of the Pacific. Yet, Japan was destined to lose unless
America’s overwhelming capacity for war was subverted by a collapse of political will to pay the necessary price. However, the Japanese attack on Pearl
Harbor had eliminated that possibility. Again, the
intriguing question arises: What if Japan had avoided
attacking U.S. territory in December 1941?
Belief that the Japanese could bleed the Americans
into a compromise settlement of the war rested on a
fourth assumption (or at least hope): Japanese racial
and spiritual superiority could neutralize America’s
physical superiority. Japan was neither the first nor
last of America’s enemies to stress the human element
in war and to underestimate the resolve of Americans
at war. Mao Zedong, Ho Chi Minh, Mohamed Farad
Aideed, and Osama bin Laden all recognized America’s material advantage but believed they could defeat
it by mobilizing such intangibles as a greater willingness to fight and die and a strategy and set of tactics
designed to sidestep superior U.S. firepower. The Japanese knew they would be outgunned by the United
States, but they believed that the unique qualities of
their race—racial purity, martial skill, willpower,
discipline—could defeat the “soft” Americans. “The
Japanese regarded us as a decadent nation in which
pacifism and isolationism practically ruled the policy
of our government,” testified Joseph Grew, U.S.
Ambassador to Japan, after the war. Willmott notes
that modern Japan in 1941 was:
a nation with no experience in defeat and, more
importantly a nation [that believed itself] created by
gods, and ruled by a god [Emperor Hirohito]. . . . This
religious dimension provided the basis for the belief in
the superiority of the Japanese martial [prowess] that was
a guarantee against national defeat.40
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As for America, many Japanese shared the view of
Rear Admiral Tasuku Nakazawa, Chief of the Imperial
Navy’s operational section:
a composite nation of immigrants [that] lack[s] unity, [can]
not withstand adversity and privation, and regard[s] war
as a form of sport, so that if we deal a severe blow at the
outset they will lose the will to fight.41

In Japanese eyes, writes John Dower, “all Westerners
were assumed to be selfish and egoistic, and incapable of mobilizing for a long fight in a distant place.” It
was also assumed that Germany would defeat Britain
and that the U.S. war effort “would be undercut by any
number of debilitating forces endemic to contemporary” American society such as “isolationist sentiment,
labor agitation, racial strife, political factionalism [and]
‘plutocratic profiteering’.”42 As a creature-comforted
society, America was simply too feckless to sustain the
blood and treasure costs of a long, faraway, and harsh
war, especially in a region where the strength of U.S.
interests was weak relative to Japan’s. At some point,
the capitalists who controlled the country would turn
against a war whose balance sheet was registering far
more costs than benefits.
John Lynn has pointed out that, barring Japanese
racial stereotyping of Americans as:
soft, self-indulgent, and incapable of serious sacrifice . . .
Japanese war plans made no sense, since Tokyo realized
that the advantage of numbers in manpower and material
always rested with the United States.43

Japan’s relative poverty virtually dictated an embrace
of racial and spiritual power over material strength.
(Fairness demands recognition that racism also colored American views of the Japanese. Aside from a
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long history of anti-Asian racism in the United States,
especially on the West Coast, many Americans in 1941
regarded the Japanese as racially inferior, even barely
human, and the German-Japanese alliance of 1940 as a
union of master and servant. Indeed, many Americans,
including Secretary of War Henry Stimson, believed
the Japanese were incapable of planning, much less
executing the attack on Pearl Harbor, and were dumbfounded by the string of stunning operational successes
the Japanese achieved against the West in Southeast
Asia in the first half of 1942. In fact, the Germans were
not even informed of the Pearl Harbor attack by their
Japanese “allies.”)44
The presence of a materially superior enemy, especially one as powerful as the United States, encourages the conviction that the intangibles of war can be
employed to neutralize or even overcome physical disadvantage. Mao Zedong clearly understood this and
adopted a strategy of prolonged irregular warfare as
the solution. The prerequisite of weaker-side success,
however, is not to go “regular” prematurely—i.e., to
avoid falling into the trap before one is ready; of playing the stronger side’s game of engaging in direct,
regular, and conventional combat. That is a recipe
for defeat, as the Vietnamese communists discovered
during the Tet Offensive of early 1968, and the Islamic
State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) discovered later in Syria
and Iraq when it attempted a positional defense of the
territory it controlled.
The Japanese, however, had no viable irregular warfare options. They were compelled to wage
the kind of war for which they had been trained and
equipped, as eager imitators of the Western great
powers, and to wage it against a firepower-dominant
foe, which among other things possessed the resources
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and scientific talent to harness the destructive power
of the atom. Given Pearl Harbor’s inoculation of American public opinion against any thought of a conditional Japanese surrender, it is difficult to imagine any
outcome of the Pacific War other than unconditional
surrender.
This is not to belittle the contribution to victory
of the U.S. performance at the operational and tactical levels of war. The Americans planned effectively
and presciently, were well led, and fought with skill
and determination. They perfected the complex art of
amphibious warfare and used their submarine force
and air power with devastating effect against Japanese
shipping and the Japanese home islands themselves.
Moreover, they demonstrated a willingness to sacrifice blood and treasure that utterly refuted Japanese
assumptions.
Midway, Guadalcanal, Leyte Gulf, the Philippine
Sea, and Okinawa have all been cited as turning points
in the Pacific War. What about Pearl Harbor? Did it not
initiate a war that Japan was doomed to lose? Could
the Japanese have done anything differently after Pearl
Harbor to avoid defeat?
FASCIST ITALY
Shortly before he committed suicide, Adolph Hitler
confessed that his friendship with Benito Mussolini:
could be added to the list of my mistakes. It is visible that
the Italian alliance rendered more service to the enemy
than to ourselves. The intervention of Italy . . . brought
us an infinitesimal aid in comparison with the numerous
difficulties which it has created for us. [Italy] contributed
. . . to making us lose the war. . . .[Hitler concluded] The
greatest service which Italy could have done to us was to
have kept out of the conflict.45
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Italy was the weakest of the three major Axis Powers,
and in fact lacked the resources and military prowess
to become the great power that Mussolini longed for
her to be. In terms of peak-year wartime GDP (in billions of 1990 dollars), Italy ($151 billion in 1939) ranked
well behind Germany ($437 billion in 1944) and Japan
($197 billion in 1942). Italy was dwarfed by the United
States ($1,499 trillion in 1944), Russia ($495 trillion in
1944), and the United Kingdom ($351 billion in 1943).46
As Hitler judged, Italy proved to be a strategic liability for Germany. Italian military failures in the Balkans
and North Africa in 1941 diverted German forces into
both areas just as Hitler was preparing to invade the
Soviet Union. It is testimony to the Mussolini regime’s
fundamental feebleness that Hitler felt compelled to
invade most of Italy in 1943, in the wake of Mussolini’s
dismissal and arrest by King Victor Emmanuel. (Unlike
Hitler, Mussolini was simply head of government, not
head of state. In addition, unlike Hitler, who brooked
no institutional challenge to his authority, Mussolini
shared power and authority in Italy with both the Vatican and the monarchy, which commanded the Italian
military’s primary loyalty.)
Fascist Italy’s ends-means gap was even greater
than Imperial Japan’s. Mussolini had visions about
recreating a Roman-dominated Mediterranean empire,
which of course would have required the expulsion of
the British and French powers in the region—a task
well beyond Italy’s military capacity. Throughout
the war Britain controlled the western (Gibraltar) and
eastern (Suez) entrances to the Mediterranean, which
among other things forced Italy into utter dependence
on Germany for its industrial raw materials. British
forces also routinely defeated Italian naval forces at
sea and military forces on land in North Africa. The
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battleship-centric Italian Navy lacked aircraft carriers
and effective radar, and the Italian Army’s leadership
rejected mechanization in favor of continued reliance
on foot infantry and mules. The army entered World
War II with essentially the same weapons and mindset
it had in World War I.
Compounding the Italian military’s mediocre performance—and in part a cause of it—was the war’s
unpopularity. Despite almost 20 years of Fascist rule,
most Italians had little taste for a war of any kind in
1940, much less a war on the side an overbearing ally
and (after 1941) against an enemy as popular in Italy
as the United States. In contrast to Nazi Germany and
Imperial Japan, the regime’s attempt to inspire popular worship of national martial glory failed utterly,
and Mussolini’s strategically nonsensical decision to
send a large Italian Army to fight alongside Germany
in Russia hardly improved the dictator’s popularity.
Italian forces retreated and/or surrendered in droves
wherever they were sent, prompting Mussolini to complain to his foreign minister (and son-in-law) Count
Galeazzo in 1941:
Have you ever seen a lamb become a wolf? The Italian
race is a race of sheep. Eighteen years [of fascist rule]
are not enough to change them. It takes a hundred and
eighty, or maybe even a hundred and eighty centuries.47

Unlike the Germans and the Japanese, the Italian
performance at all three levels of war—strategic, operational, and tactical—was disastrous, dooming her to
certain and early defeat. Indeed, it is difficult to speak
of an Italian war effort when compared to the other
major belligerents. Italian military expenditure peaked
at 23 percent of GDP in 1941 (compared, for example,
to Germany’s 70 percent in 1943, and America’s 42
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percent in 1944). Moreover, Italy lost only 205,000 military and 25,000 civilians in World War II, or just over
one-third of its death toll in World War I. By comparison, Germany suffered 7,000,000 military and civilian
deaths.48
Italy was simply not a serious military power when
compared to her allies and enemies (except backward
foes like the Libyans and the Ethiopians), and she was
trapped in the suffocating embrace of a contemptuous
ally.49 MacGregor Knox observed:
the humiliating inadequacy of Italian military
performance in 1940-43 had sources far more complex
than the alleged primacy of the regime’s propaganda,
and . . . those sources were reciprocally interrelated at a
variety of levels. Parochialism, fragile military traditions,
shortages of key technical skills; energy and raw material
dependence; the regime’s inability to mobilize effectively
what resources existed; the incompetence and venality of
industry; the deficiencies in military culture that prevented
the armed forces from imagining, much less preparing
for modern war; strategic myopia, dissipation of effort,
passivity, logistical ineffectiveness, and dependence [on
Germany]; and the armed forces’ greater or lesser degrees
of operational and tactical incapacity were so interwoven
that separating them analytically is a thankless task.50

Italy’s fortunes in World War II might have fared
better had the so-called Rome-Berlin-Tokyo Axis been
a genuine alliance, based on common war aims and
governed by a unified command structure. However,
the Axis Powers had nothing but divergent war aims
and no common command apparatus remotely resembling the Anglo-American Combined Chiefs of Staff or
even the more informal consultative but effective strategic relationship between Roosevelt, Churchill, and
Stalin. On the contrary, the Axis was little more than
a collection of tyrannical regimes united only by their
21

hatred of the West and communism and by their desire
for imperial expansion in their respective regions of
the world. Neither Hitler, Mussolini, nor Hedeki Tojo
bothered to inform each other of their plans, including
the momentous German decision to invade the Soviet
Union and the no less fatal Japanese decision to attack
Pearl Harbor. Geography in any event prohibited any
meaningful direct cooperation between Nazi Germany
and Imperial Japan, and Fascist Italy’s proximity to
Hitler’s Germany proved fatal.
NAZI GERMANY
I have argued that the combination of acute material inferiority and gross strategic incompetence condemned Japan and Italy to certain defeat. To be sure,
one can never dismiss the role of contingency and
human factors in determining war outcomes. However, given the degree of Japanese and Italian resource
inferiority and strategic recklessness, it is difficult to
imagine the circumstances that could have spared
Tokyo and Rome the fate that befell them. For example, suppose that the Japanese had destroyed the
entire U.S. Pacific Fleet (including its three aircraft carriers) in December 1941, and then went on to occupy
the Hawaiian Islands. Such a feat clearly would have
delayed the return of U.S. naval and air power across
the Pacific and the ultimate destruction of the Japanese
home islands (an aircraft carrier-less U.S. Pacific Fleet
could not have stopped the Japanese in the critical battles of the Coral Sea and Midway). In the final analysis,
however, the United States was simply too powerful,
too distant, and too enraged to have been denied an
eventual and decisive victory in the Pacific War.
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Nazi Germany presents a more complicated case.
Like Japan, Germany was physically weaker than its
combined adversaries were, at least after 1941, when
it added the Soviet Union and the United States to
its list of enemies. Even by the time of Pearl Harbor
in December 1941, however, German misfortune in
Russia may have already fated Hitler to ultimate strategic disaster. Blitzkrieg, a novel method of employing mechanized ground forces, tactical air power, and
radio communications in tandem that had worked so
well elsewhere in Europe, came to grief in Russia for
reasons that ought to have been apparent to its proponents. Once again, as with the Japanese in East Asia,
German imperial objectives were permitted to outrun
available economic and military means. “Hitler was
powerless to alter the underlying balance of economic
and military force,” concludes Adam Tooze:
The German economy was simply not strong enough
to create the military force necessary to overwhelm all
its European neighbors, including both Britain and the
Soviet Union, let alone the United States.51

Nazi Germany was nonetheless the most powerful
and strategically dangerous Axis state. Had it defeated
Russia in 1941, as it expected to do—and almost did—
it is difficult to envision how Britain and the United
States could have successfully challenged Hitler’s control of Europe. As John Lukacs observed:
the Anglo-American alliance, for all its tremendous
material and financial and industrial and manpower
superiority, could not really have conquered Hitler’s
Germany without Russia. That’s why June 22, 1941 [the
date of Operation BARBAROSSA, Germany’s invasion
of Russia] was the most important turning point of the
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Second World War, [even] more important than Pearl
Harbor.52

The Soviet Union was the only state within Hitler’s
military reach that was big enough, powerful enough,
and fierce enough to absorb a German attack and
then counterattack. To be sure, Russia benefitted substantially from U.S. Lend-Lease assistance, including
weapons, ammunition, foodstuffs, vehicles, aircraft,
oil, and other raw materials. However, that assistance
did not arrive in great quantities until early 1943 (just
as the Germans were surrendering at Stalingrad).
The numbers are stupendous. The German war
against Russia cost the Soviet Union an estimated
27,000,000 military and civilian deaths (out of a total
population of 160,000,000) and much of its territory
and industrial infrastructure. Yet in each year of the
4-year conflict, including the disastrous year of 1941,
the Soviets out-produced Germany in such key items
as aircraft, tanks, and artillery.53 (In terms of gross
war production of World War II’s major combatants,
the Soviet Union ranked second only to the United
States.)54 In 1942 alone, despite territorial and other
losses that amounted to a 25 percent drop in GDP, the
Soviet Union achieved war production ratios over Germany of 3:1 in small arms and artillery, 4:1 in tanks,
and 2:1 in combat aircraft.55
Moreover, though Germany consistently outperformed all of its enemies at the tactical and operational
levels of war, it was Russia which, to paraphrase Winston Churchill, tore the guts out of the German Army.56
Though the Soviets suffered 65 percent of all Allied
military casualties during the war (the United States
and Britain about 2 percent each),57 they accounted for
4 out of 5 (80 percent) of all German military dead in
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World War II.58 According to John Ellis, between June
1941 and March 1945 (2 months before Germany surrendered), a total of 4,900,000 German soldiers were
killed or wounded on the Eastern Front, as opposed
to about 580,000 in northeastern Europe against Eisenhower’s armies.59 Even by November 1, 1941, a month
before the Battle of Moscow, German casualties totaled
686,000, or one-fifth of Operation BARBAROSSA’s
starting invasion force of 3,400,000 (with one-for-one
replacements nowhere in sight).60
As a killing machine, the German Army was
unquestionably better than its competitors, especially
the Red army. The statistics are unequivocal: up to
the end of 1944, “on a man-to-man basis, the Germans
inflicted between 20 and 50 percent higher casualties
on the British and Americans than they suffered, and
far higher than that on the Russians,” notes Andrew
Roberts. Moreover, they did so “under almost all military conditions [including Allied air superiority]. . . . it
is indisputable that the Germans were the finest fighting force of the Second World War.”61 No wonder it
took the overwhelmingly resource-rich Allies so long
to bring Germany down! (Even before BARBAROSSA
and the full ramp-up of the U.S. war economy, the
combined GDP of the United States, Britain, and the
Soviet Union exceeded that of Germany by 436 percent.62) Even in 1939, the combined GDP of just Britain
and France alone was 60 percent greater than that of
Germany and Italy.63
Clearly, the Eastern Front was the decisive theater
of operations of World War II (although this conclusion
has been recently—and ridiculously—challenged by
Phillips Payson O’Brien64). However, why did events
there turn out the way they did? Was it simply a clash
of strength? Or were there other factors at work? How
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could an army as tactically and operationally skilled as
the Wehrmacht be defeated? Indeed, why did Hitler
invade Russia in the first place? Was not Nazi domination of Europe already a fact? Could Hitler have won
in Russia, and why did he not?
First things first: Hitler believed he was destined by
Providence to invade the Soviet Union for ideological
and strategic reasons. His Nazi ideology told him that
it was his fate to establish a race-based empire in Slavic
Europe that would put an end to Jewry and communism and that he was the only German capable of fulfilling that mission. “Essentially it all depends on me,
on my existence because of my political talents,” Hitler
pronounced in 1939.65 Ian Kershaw observed that even
before World War II, Hitler had “little sense of his own
limitations.” On the contrary, he had:
a calamitous over-estimation of his own abilities, coupled
with an extreme denigration of those—particularly in
the military—who argued more rationally for greater
caution.66

Hitler also believed that destroying Russia would
eliminate Great Britain’s last remaining potential ally
on the continent and thereby finally compel London to
come to terms—Hitler’s terms of course—with Berlin.
Hitler’s reasoning was not unsound. Britain had little
chance of surviving a war with Germany in full control of continental Europe’s vast resources, including
those of Russia. Conquest of Russia would also afford
him (he thought) the resources necessary to defeat
the United States, which he regarded as an inevitable
enemy.
Hitler further saw in Russia’s conquest the destruction of the world’s only communist regime and the
opportunity—finally—to rid Europe of its Jewry.
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In fact, within weeks after the first German soldier
crossed the Russian border the mass shooting of Jews
(and communists) began. The campaign in Russia provided “the cover of traditional [military operations]”
under which Hitler could launch “a murderous racial
struggle.”67
Finally, Hitler believed he could take Russia, just
as he had taken France in 1940. After all, had not Germany already overrun most of Europe in lightning
campaigns? True, Britain remained in the field, but
no English Channel protected the Soviet Union. And
were not the Russians racially dullard Slavs incapable
of conducting modern warfare or designing first-class
weapons? And had not Stalin recently murdered the
best and the brightest of the Red army’s senior leadership? And did not Russia’s post-purge military performance in its war against Finland (1939-40) prove to be
nothing short of embarrassing?
There were good reasons to conclude that the
Soviet Union could be knocked out in a single summer
campaign in 1941. Ideology and recent history bred
confidence in Berlin, and of course the Germans didn’t
know what they didn’t know—for example, that the
size and regenerative power of the Red army was far
greater than estimated, and that the quality of many
Soviet weapons, notably the T-34 tank, was much better
than imagined. The Germans also seemed oblivious to
the fact that blitzkrieg, which had worked so well in
the relatively small and developed Western European
states, might not work in the vast and comparatively
road-less expanses of Russia.
In the case of France, Hitler did not seem to recognize what a high-risk gamble the German victory had
been. Tooze has argued that the 1940 campaign against
France:
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was not a repeatable outcome. In fact, when we appreciate
the high risks involved in Manstein’s plan, the attack on
France appears to be more similar to the Wehrmacht’s
other great gamble, the attack on the Soviet Union in June
1941.68

Blitzkrieg was a fast, short-reach instrument dependent on a network of all-weather roads and on good
weather itself. It also rested on a single-shift, short-war
German economy, which was not fully mobilized for
total war until 1942 after it became evident that Germany was facing a long war. Such an economy could
support swift, sequential military campaigns, but not a
protracted war against a giant, resource-rich coalition.
(If one can get away with a string of short wars, why
waste the time and money preparing for long ones?)
Indeed, Germany in 1941—before the war turned
global—was neither economically, nor militarily prepared for a multi-year conflict with a resource-superior coalition. For Germany, operational success still
meant strategic success, and the Germans were in fact
prone to equate the two.
The Germans also seemed to ignore the implications of their army’s own force structure. The army that
entered the Soviet Union in June 1941 had a blitzkrieg
component, but was still predominantly a slow-moving, muscle-powered force of foot infantry and horses.
The army’s cutting edge—the face of blitzkrieg—consisted of 19 armored (tank) divisions and 14 motorized
(truck-mounted infantry) divisions. It was this spear
tip that crashed through Russia’s border defenses and
raced deep into the country, encircling vast Soviet forces
as they went. The rest of the Operation BARBAROSSA
force consisted of 112 infantry divisions that relied on
marching for their mobility and horse-drawn artillery
for their organic fire support.69 (The German Army
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entered Russia with an estimated 600,000 to 750,000
horses.70) Predictably, the fast tip outran the slow
shaft, creating problems of coordination and leaving
gaping open spaces between the two.
Operation BARBAROSSA failed for several reasons. First, Hitler’s military plate was already pretty
full. Substantial German forces were tied down in
Western and Central Europe. Additionally, Fascist
Italy was fast becoming a costly strategic liability for
Germany. Italian military failures in Greece and Libya
had sucked German forces into the Balkans and North
Africa. And of course the British, whom the Germans
could not conquer, remained defiant and in a de facto
alliance with the United States. Indeed, Hitler was
motivated to invade Russia in part because he believed
the United States was fast moving to enter the war on
Britain’s side and he wanted to eliminate the Soviet
Union before that happened.
In attacking the Soviet Union, Hitler violated perhaps the most important, hard-learned German military injunction of all: avoid the trap of a two-front war.
(The United States turned out to be the only World
War II combatant capable of successfully waging a
robust two-front war.) Even Stalin was surprised. He
ignored repeated warnings of BARBAROSSA because
he believed them to be disinformation and because he
refused to believe that Hitler would be so reckless to
start a war with the Soviet Union before he had first
finished off Britain. Albert Seaton has argued that:
the overthrow of the USSR [Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics] would have required the whole German
economy and all of the German reserves, and there could
have been no question of dissipating forces in Africa, the
Balkans, Scandinavia and Western Europe, or of fighting
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Britain in a bitter air and sea war. Adding the United
States to its enemies was the final senseless act.71

Second, blitzkrieg ran afoul of Russian distances,
weather, and primitive infrastructure. Russia was not
France or the Low Countries. Stephen Fritz has estimated that the German Army’s armored and motorized components could project themselves in a single
bound no farther than 300 miles, after which they
would have to stop, rest, and refit for additional operations.72 This limit did not matter much in Western
Europe, where states were relatively small and had
good road networks. In Russia, however, a thrust of
300 miles left invading German forces still 400 miles
from Moscow and much farther from the oil and other
resources of southern Russia. Moreover, those miles
were not just any miles. Of the 850,000 miles of road
in the USSR in 1941, only 40,000, or less than 5 percent,
were hard-surfaced, all-weather roads.73 The rest were
dirt roads or sandy tracks that turned into goo in the
spring and fall rainy seasons.
To the long east-west distances must be added
the peculiar challenge of expanding north-south distances. The farther the Germans moved eastward, the
broader the front became because of the funnel-like
shape of Soviet territory west of the Urals. Operation BARBAROSSA started along a front of 900 miles,
which later expanded to 1,500 miles.74 Together these
horizontal and vertical distances dramatically reduced
German force-to-space rations to the point where large
expanses of Russian territory escaped German control,
a situation ideal for the kind of partisan warfare the
Russians waged with increasing effectiveness after
1941.
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As for the Russian weather, much has been made
of it. Yes, Russian winters were harsh, as Napoleon
discovered in 1812. However, the point is that the Russians were prepared for it whereas the Germans were
not. Hitler did not order the issuance of winter gear
and clothing to the German Army in Russia either
because he thought the war would be over before the
first snowfall or because he thought it would demoralize the troops, or both. The end result was that those
German forces that made it far enough to be thrown
back before Moscow were severely disadvantaged in
dealing with fresh Soviet forces, especially Siberian
divisions trained, equipped, and clothed for winter
warfare.
Third, the scope and tenacity of Russian resistance,
the apex of which was Stalin’s iron determination,
greatly exceeded German expectations. A combination
of murderous German behavior in Russia, Soviet reliance on a vast pool of trained manpower reserves, and
an astonishing war production capacity that permitted
Moscow not only to replace its battlefield losses but
also to expand the Red army at the same time stunned
the Germans. Russian manpower losses were, to be
sure, historically unprecedented. Stalin and his generals were bowled over by what hit them on June 22,
1941. Between late June and the end of the year the Red
army sustained losses (killed and captured) of about
3,000,000 men, including 2,000,000 prisoners of war
(POWs) (most of whom the Germans allowed to die
in captivity). Equipment losses included almost 15,000
tanks, 66,000 artillery pieces, and 7,000 aircraft.75
The key to this transition from near swift and utter
defeat to resurrection, which amounted to the most spectacular military recovery in history, was the existence,
unbeknownst to the Germans, of a rapidly mobilized
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pool of trained military reserves of 14,000,000 men.76
On the eve of BARBAROSSA, the Germans estimated
that the Red army contained 200 divisions available
for combat in western Russia. By the end of the year,
the Russians had generated enough new divisions to
stop further German advances: 97 divisions from outside western Russia, including 17 from Siberia, and 94
newly raised brigades.77 An unnerved General Franz
Halder, Chief of Staff of the German Army, confided
to his diary that “we have underestimated the Russian
colossus. . . . At the start of the war we had counted
about 200 enemy divisions. We have now counted
about 360.” To be sure, “These divisions are not as well
armed or equipped as ours [and] they are often poorly
led. But there they are. And if we knock out a dozen of
them, then the Russians put up another dozen.”78
Fourth, the savagery of German behavior stiffened
Soviet resistance and precluded any thought of exploiting ethnic and other discontent with Stalin’s rule.
Hitler made it crystal clear from the beginning that the
war in the East was going to be quite different from the
1940 campaigns in the West. It was to be a war of annihilation and enslavement against Germany’s political
and racial enemies—i.e., communists, Slavs, and Jews.
No quarter would be given. Commissars and other
Soviet officials would be shot on the spot. Millions of
Slavs, including Soviet POWs, would be left to starve
or worked to death. Indeed, the Nazis had developed a plan to deliberately starve 30,000,000 Russian
city-dwellers in order to free up foodstuffs for delivery
to Germany.79 As for the Jews, the opportunity to kill
them outright had at last arisen, and in fact, the first
mass shootings of Jews began in the summer of 1941.
Geoffrey Megargee summarized the set of attitudes,
beliefs, and assumptions behind the German campaign

32

of conquest and genocide in the East. In addition to
“faith in their own superiority,” “loathing of Jews and
Slavs,” and “fear and hatred of Marxism and conflation of it with Jewishness,” the Germans believed they
were locked in an “existential struggle” that granted
“Germany’s right to use any means to win.”80
By the end of September, none of this was lost on the
Russians. If they had no future under Nazi rule except
serfdom or death, then they had every reason to fight
on to the death. Certainly, Stalin and his regime had
no future under Hitler, which raises the still-debated
questions of Moscow’s strategic value and whether
Stalin would have continued fighting had the Germans taken the city. Would Moscow’s fall have made
any difference in the war? The answer is: probably not.
Napoleon took Moscow in 1812 and still lost his war
against Russia. Moreover, taking Moscow would have
been a tall order given the onset of winter, Hitler’s
indecision, the ragged state of Army Group Center,
and the arrival of fresh Soviet divisions for Moscow’s
defense. Second, Stalin, though prepared to evacuate
the city and fight on (as had Czar Alexander I in 1812),
nevertheless ordered a last stand before Moscow that
in fact saved the city. He was a man who certainly
had nothing to lose. Defeat of the Soviet Union almost
certainly would have meant the liquidation of Stalin
and his regime. Even with Moscow gone, “there can
be little doubt that Stalin would have continued,” contends Seaton, “particularly when he had been assured
the support of the United States.”81
Looking back, the failure of Nazi Germany to conquer the Soviet Union in 1941 was the turning point
of World War II. Hitler’s only hope was that BARBAROSSA would deliver a shock that the Soviet Union
could not withstand. With Russia out of the war, Hitler
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would have been able to mobilize all the resources of
continental Europe solely against the Anglo-Americans who, without the Russian giant, would have
been hard put to challenge Hitler’s writ on the continent. Yet Stalin did not break, which meant that Hitler
was no longer able to translate even the most spectacular operational victories into war-winning outcomes. Particularly with entry of the United States into
the war, Nazi Germany was condemned to probable
destruction. After 1941, Germany could and did rack
up impressive operational successes, but not of sufficient strategic significance to alter the war’s ending.
Moreover, by failing to avoid a protracted war, Hitler
afforded a resource-rich United States time to mobilize
overwhelming power, including the time to develop
and field atomic weapons.
The key to Soviet survival was Stalin’s ability to
absorb BARBAROSSA without losing his nerve and
then to transition to offensive operations. The Soviet
Union and its leadership simply turned out to be too
big and too determined to buckle in the face of the
Nazi onslaught. True, there was a moment when Stalin
wavered. A week after the invasion, when the magnitude of the disaster became apparent, Stalin, depressed
by manpower and territorial losses and the breakdown of communications between Moscow and Soviet
forces in the field, “withdrew in despair to his dacha
outside Moscow, prompting his frightened politburo
colleagues . . . to drive out and coax him back to the
Kremlin.”82 From then on, however, Stalin remained
resolute. By the end of 1941, Stalin had taken the worst
that Hitler could throw at him, and he remained firmly
in political control of Russia. He made good his military losses and was increasingly ahead of Hitler in
war production. He was also already formulating his
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territorial objectives in post-Nazi Europe. The road
ahead would be long and hard, but he had survived
to fight on.
By the end of 1941, Hitler had allowed Germany to
be trapped in a protracted war against a coalition possessing—or soon to possess—overwhelming material
superiority. It was now a war he could not win as long
as the Grand Alliance remained committed to Germany’s complete defeat. Hitler’s only hope was Stalin’s
defection from that alliance. However, this was most
unlikely absent substantial German territorial concessions (starting with Berlin’s agreement to evacuate
Russia) that Hitler was hardly prepared to make to a
Stalin bent on exacting terrible revenge and securing
a Soviet security buffer zone in Eastern Europe. By
failing before Moscow and then gratuitously declaring
war on the United States, Hitler had escalated his war
aims well beyond his capacity to fulfill them. Yes, there
were considerable tensions between the Anglo-Americans and the Russians—e.g., the timing and location
of a second front against Germany and the disposition
of post-war Europe, especially Germany and Eastern
Europe—but Germany was in no position to forge a
separate peace with Moscow that was mutually acceptable to both Hitler and Stalin.
It should be noted at this juncture that Russia’s survival in 1941 was no guarantee of Germany’s defeat
in 1945. While it is true that the Russians tore the guts
out of the German Army, they could not have done
so without Anglo-American participation in the war,
absent which the Soviet Union might well have been
destroyed by Hitler. The Russo-German War was a
close-run contest, especially in 1941-42, and Russian
manpower reserves were not unlimited, especially
given the horrendously unfavorable casualty exchange
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rations the Germans managed to impose upon the Russians throughout the war. The Anglo-Americans not
only compelled Hitler to divert significant forces away
from the Eastern Front—in North Africa, Italy, and
in the skies over Germany itself—they also provided
Russia enormous quantities of Lend-Lease assistance,
especially after 1942, that permitted Russia to replace
its huge material losses, including hundreds of thousands of motor vehicles that afforded the Red Army
the mobility that enabled it to exploit its critical victories of 1944-45. If the Anglo-Americans could not have
defeated Hitler without Russia’s help, the Russians
alone could not have done so without Anglo-American military pressure on the Third Reich and massive
material assistance to Stalin. Additionally, the Pacific
War, conducted almost exclusively by the United
States, insured that the Soviet Union could wage its
one-front war against Germany without fear of having
to fight in the Far East as well.
At this point in our examination, Hitler himself, the
most destructive leader in human history,83 deserves
further comment. For starters, Hitler had no sense of
the limits of German power despite Germany’s defeat
in World War I (in which he served) by essentially
the same coalition that he found himself at war with
in World War II. He believed, at least until Stalingrad
(or Kursk or Normandy), that Germany’s racial and
martial superiority—plus his own genius, Providential
destiny, and iron will—made victory inevitable.
His ideology also told him that the Russians were
a bunch of sub-human Slavs destined for slavery or
extermination under German rule and that the United
States was a Jewish-dominated and racially mongrelized society that lacked the will and military skills
to defeat Germany. (The Japanese, as noted, also
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dismissed America as a decadent society lacking the
will to wage decisive war.)
Nor did Hitler recognize that the odiousness of
Nazi ideology, Germany’s behavior in Russia, and Berlin’s manifest territorial ambitions all generated both
powerful enemies and weak allies. He valued Mussolini as Europe’s senior fascist leader, but was victimized by Italy’s military incompetence, and in the end
invaded his ally and reduced Mussolini to a pathetic
German puppet. Hitler respected Japan’s fighting
power, although he regarded the Japanese themselves
as nothing more than little yellow monkeys.
Hitler also believed himself to be a military genius
on par with Frederick the Great. He never fully trusted
Germany’s military leadership and constantly interfered at the operational and even tactical levels of decision-making. (Can anyone imagine President Franklin
Roosevelt telling Eisenhower or MacArthur how to
run their campaigns and fight their battles?)
Hitler, in short, was an incompetent strategist and
military leader, and he was so in part because of a pernicious ideology and extreme self-worship that polluted his judgment. These factors also help explain
why Hitler chose to fight on long after it became objectively clear that Germany was defeated. Hitler was
notoriously stubborn, and he had come to believe, in
his last surreal underground bunker days, that the
“master race” German people had failed him. (How
dare they!) Indeed, the once subhuman Slavs, now
practically standing on top of his bunker, were now
the race of destiny. Under these circumstances and
given Hitler’s evident responsibility for the massacre
of millions, Hitler had no future preferable to death by
suicide. Therefore, he killed himself.
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SOME CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
What does World War II tell us about ends,
means, ideology, pride, and war? First, Clausewitz—
to repeat—was right: numbers matter, and the best
strategy is to be strong. The strong lose occasionally,
but it is easier to win if you are stronger. In the case
of World War II, acute resource inferiority is the starting point for explaining why the Axis lost. The Axis
faced an array of enemies (after 1941) whose collective
resources posed a daunting challenge to strategic military success. Consider, for example, that in 1941 the
combined GDP of Britain, the Soviet Union, and the
United States were twice that of the Axis Powers, a
ratio that grew to 3:1 in 1944.84 In the case of Japan,
its resource inferiority vis-à-vis the United States was
such that it almost certainly doomed Tokyo to defeat
from the start of the Pacific War regardless of Japan’s
subsequent operational performance.
This is not to argue that the strong always win.
They do not. However, for the weak to win they must
find ways to compensate for their weakness—a greater
willingness to fight and die, a more effective strategy, foreign help, etc. Germany and Japan knew they
were physically disadvantaged, but believed that their
racial superiority and advantage in other intangibles
provided sufficient compensation.
Second, ideology can distort sound strategic judgment. Tooze has rightly observed “Hitler’s conduct of
the war involved risks so great that they defy rationalization in terms of pragmatic self-interest.”85 Why
he did so—and why the Japanese took even greater
risks in attacking the United States—can be explained
only by the presence of powerful ideologies that poisoned common sense. Both Germany and Japan were
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victimized by extreme ideologies of racial superiority
that prompted them to overestimate their own fighting power and underestimate that of their enemies.
Confidence in the success of Operation BARBAROSSA
rested heavily on the assumption that the Slavic Russians were incapable of effectively resisting an invasion by the Aryan Germans. The Japanese viewed the
Americans as a racially impure country too undisciplined to sustain the blood and treasure sacrifices necessary to drive the Rising Sun out of East Asia. True,
the Americans also disparaged the Japanese, but there
is no evidence that their racism significantly affected
U.S. strategic decision-making or operational planning. The Roosevelt administration’s critical decision
to prioritize Germany’s defeat over Japan’s was based
on the indisputable fact that Germany was by far the
greater threat to core U.S. security interests.
Enemy derogation of American society continues to
this day. To survive war with the United States, much
less win, adversaries must not only adopt some form
of protracted irregular warfare, but also must convince
themselves that Americans are morally weak—i.e.,
that notwithstanding their superior hard power, they
lack the guts and political stamina to prevail in the end.
Osama bin Laden, who was emboldened by America’s
defeats in Vietnam, Lebanon, and Somalia, believed
that he could force a casualty-sensitive United States
out of the Middle East by committing acts of terror
against the American homeland. He sorely underestimated, as did the Japanese in 1941, the consequences
of directly attacking American territory and the resilience and determination of American society at war
once attacked.
True, suicide bombers, be they kamikazes directed
against U.S. warships or Islamic terrorists flying
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commercial airliners into buildings, are tactically very
effective and difficult to deter or stop. They can, and
have, inflicted considerable death and destruction.
However, they do not confer strategic victory. Nor do
they pose an existential threat to the United States—
any more so than did the Axis, for whom the United
States was simply too distant and powerful to be
threatened, much less defeated. Even the detonation
of a nuclear device in an American city by an Islamic
terrorist group, though horrible to contemplate, would
not threaten the survival of the United States. Only
massive thermo-nuclear missile strikes could do that.
After all, most German and Japanese cities were obliterated by air attack in World War II, and both countries
survived and rebuilt themselves. The Axis states posed
a far greater threat to world peace in the 1940s than do
terrorist organizations today, precisely because they
were powerful states and not weak nonstate actors.
Terrorism is a challenge, but overreaction to it—e.g.,
invading Iraq and embracing torture—is self-defeating. ISIS is an exceptionally vicious organization and
it has inspired a growing amount of terrorist attacks
in the West. However, it should not be mistaken for
anything other than a desperate, weak actor incapable
of overthrowing the established democratic order in
Western societies. Nazi Germany it is not.
A striking example of ideology’s capacity to deform
strategic judgment was Hitler’s attitude toward
the prospect of developing an atomic bomb. Hitler
rightly rejected a proposed German bomb program
on the grounds that World War II would be over by
the time the bomb became available.86 (Former Third
Reich armaments minister Albert Speer declared in
his memoirs that even an all-out effort would not
have produced a German atomic bomb until 1947.87)
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However, Hitler scuttled the project for another reason:
Anti-Semitism. Hitler often referred to nuclear physics
as “Jewish physics” because the science was so closely
associated with prominent Jewish physicists. If nuclear
physics was in fact a Jewish discipline, then anything it
claimed the potential capacity to do was automatically
suspect.88 Thus, even had Germany been able to build
the bomb before 1945, Hitler probably still would have
rejected it.
Third, operational and tactical superiority cannot
redeem a faulty strategy. The Germans outperformed
all their enemies at the sub-strategic levels of war
throughout the conflict under almost all military conditions. The problem for Germany, as for the Confederate States of America and the United States in
Vietnam, was that winning battles and campaigns
was not sufficient to win the war—especially against
a larger, more powerful, and determined foe. Hitler
had hoped to fight a sequence of short wars against
individual states rather than a long war against an
array of states. He was surprised in 1939 when Britain and France honored their defense guarantees to
Poland, and he was undoubtedly surprised when the
German Army came up short in Russia in December
1941. Numbers counted, and at that point, Hitler did
not have them and could never hope to obtain them,
especially once the Americans joined the war. The
gap between Hitler’s war aims in Europe and German
power could no longer be bridged. After 1941, his only
hope was political, not military—i.e., making the concessions necessary to detach the Soviet Union from the
Grand Alliance.
As for the Japanese, who displayed very impressive tactical and operational skills in the early years of
World War II, their decision to attack the United States
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at a time when they were bogged down in an unwinnable war in China was strategically catastrophic. The
Pacific War was a conflict Tokyo could not possibly win
absent a collapse of American will—itself an impossibility given the impact of Pearl Harbor on American
opinion. The Germans had a chance against the Soviet
Union; the Japanese had no chance against the United
States.
Fourth, considerations of pride and honor should
never be ignored in war. The Japanese fought as long
and hard as they did because they believed surrender
to be worse than death. Better to die with honor than
to live without it. Indeed, but for Emperor Hirohito’s
decisive intervention to break a deadlocked war cabinet in the wake of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima
and Nagasaki, the diehard militarists running Japan
would have compelled the Americans to invade the
Japanese home islands, which promised a senseless
(for the Japanese) bloodbath that would have made no
difference in the Pacific War’s outcome.
The Japanese should have surrendered—at the
very latest—in March 1945, when it became clear (with
the massive firebombing of Tokyo on the night of
March 9-10) that they could no longer muster an effective defense against U.S. strategic incendiary attacks
on Japan’s largely wood-and-paper cities, to say nothing of the tightening U.S. naval blockade of the home
islands. They deluded themselves into believing that
the Americans, facing the prospect of a bloody ground
assault of the home islands, would agree to a conditional surrender that among other things would leave
Japan’s established political order in place, and spare
Japan the humiliation of a U.S. occupation.
There was also the issue of reputation. Modern
Japan had never been militarily defeated and had
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proudly created in Asia the kind of colonial empire
the West had earlier imposed on the region. Japan had
successfully mimicked and borrowed from the Western powers to become an Asian copy of a Western
imperial state complete with Western-style naval, air,
and ground forces. Having avoided the humiliation of
the kind of subjugation the West imposed on the rest
of Asia, Japan was desperate to avoid the abasement
of total defeat, which accounts in large measure for the
savagery of Japanese resistance in the Pacific, highlighted by banzai and kamikaze attacks.
It is worth noting that humiliation can and often
does promote a fanatic will to fight and die. Hitler’s
rise in the 1930s was certainly encouraged by the punitive Treaty of Versailles that the victors of World War
I imposed of Germany in 1919. Another example is
found in Osama bin Laden’s worldview, which was
profoundly shaped by an Arab world humiliated by
over a century of Western domination, mostly through
indigenous surrogate regimes happy to serve Western interests as well as their own. The mess that is the
Middle East today rests in part on a platform of violent opposition to continued Western intrusion on the
soil of a once and deservedly proud Arab civilization.
One wonders if there is a strategy, or at least a coherent strategy, underlying America’s repeated and ongoing military interventions in the Middle East. What is
their purpose? To prop up friendly regimes, some of
which—like Saudi Arabia, with its extreme religious
and gender bigotry—are reactionary and therefore
part of the problem? To kill terrorists, whose supply
in the region appears to be inexhaustible? To be seen
to be doing something about the chaos and anarchy
there, because we do not know anything else to do? Or
have we simply become addicted to knee-jerk military
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interventionism as a substitute for a broader, more
nuanced foreign policy?
Western uses of force in the Middle East generate
hatred and often violent responses, and the West’s
strength of interests in the region, though substantial,
can never equal that of the people who live there. This
means that whatever the short-term benefits of military intervention, the long-term consequences could
be worse, much worse. That is the central lesson of the
Iraq War. Yes, the war removed Saddam Hussein, but
are we better off with today’s violent, anarchic, and
pro-Teheran Iraq than Saddam’s stable and anti-Persian Iraq? To ask the question is to answer it.
In the end, the Axis lost World War II because it
was strategically incompetent. It failed to recognize the
limits of its own power and permitted its political ends
to fatally outrun its military means. Indeed, the Axis
Powers mistook operations for strategy and campaigns
as war-winners. “Germany lost the Second World War
in part because it . . . made operational thought do
duty for strategy,” concludes Hew Strachan, “while
tactical and operational success was never given the
shape which strategy could have bestowed.”89
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